The Theory of Names

Within this paper I shall focus on explanatory and underlying theories of Names, will also concentrate on the referential theory and the background it provides for Kripkes causal picture.

According to referential theory, the meaning of a Name just is the individual entity the Name refers to, within its context of use. Kripke challenges the context of use; identifying speaker disposition and introducing the variable of other possible worlds. He uses the descriptive theory to p inpoint criticisms and create his own better picture of preferentiality of Names. His specific criticisms and alternative examples examine the way in which original and subsequent users refer, with the question of what makes the usage of a Name refer specific to the individual/entity it does. Tracing meaning back to its origins is highlighted to be the most reliable way of posing a theory of how the meaning of a Name is transmitted. He introduces the concept of initial baptism; an in tentional naming through conscious pinpointing of an object and assigning it a Name. Kripke suggests that the object need not necessarily fulfil the appropriate descriptive content for the Name to refer to it and that descriptions restrict possibilities of the referentiality of Names. Kripkes account, then, most certainly contrasts with a descriptive theory, which states that Names can refer to objects when a set of descriptive properties is fulfilled, thus, the descriptivist would believe there to be properties associated with each proper Name that identify the possessor by means of the description itself.

Searle investigates the possession of a sense by proper Names, posing two disjunctive criteria for an object to possess sense: Firstly, having the usage of providing description or specifying qualities of objects, and secondly, having the property of being logically linked to qualities of the object they refer to. He concluded proper Names not to possess sense at all, according to the first criteria and that possession occurs In a loose sort of way for the second.

Kripke chose Donnellans descriptive cluster theory to structure his criticisms upon. Donnellans theory could be viewed as the most solid and comprehensive cluster theory of the time. I would suggest that Kripke embarked upon the challenge of criticising this particular theory, knowing that it could be broken down successfully to present his arguments in an organised and powerful way. On a more critical note, this organisation of what he considered to be strong condemnation acted in some way as compensation for the fact that his own causal pictures has many flaws itself. Kripke evaluated the strength of descriptive theory with partial success, before formulating his causal theory of Names, which suggest that we learn the referents of Names from the previous user in the causal chain of reference for that particular Name. My hypothesis of how his descriptive criticisms provide a basis for his own causal theory is that Kripke gained inspiration from Strawsons claims about a non-infinite regress and decided that pursuing an infinite regress was the only way to properly explain the nature of the referent of a Name and its communication between individuals. Kripkes attack on the descriptive cluster theory of Names can be divided into three groups, Namely, epistemic, semantic and modal arguments.

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Author:: Sharon White
Keywords:: Name,theory of Names,Name theories
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